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Book Review
Interracial Intimacy and the
Potential for Social Change
INTERRACIAL INTIMACY: THE REGULATION OF RACE AND ROMANCE
by Rachel F. Moran. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001.
271 pp. $ 30.00 cloth.

Reviewed by Stephanie M. Wildman†
For those interested in fighting bias and discrimination and in thinking
about how changes in our legal treatment of race has evolved, Rachel F.
Moran’s Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance, is
required reading. As we examine the historic struggle against bias and discrimination, we perceive issues from the past and often find it surprising that
these issues could have been contested, let alone decided, as they were.1
Plessy v. Ferguson,2 proclaiming in 1896 that separate but equal accommodations were constitutional, is often cited as an example of a case that was
wrong “the day it was decided.”3 I do think Plessy was wrong, but we modern-day critics have the benefit of hindsight as we view these past decisions.
How will our decisions of today look from the vantage point of 100 years in
the future?4 As warriors in the fight against bias and discrimination, we must
consider how our actions will fare when viewed in the pages of history. We
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2.
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Copyright © 2002, Stephanie M. Wildman
Professor of Law and Director, Center for Social Justice and Public Service, Santa Clara
University School of Law. My thanks to Angela Harris, Joan Howarth, Marnie Mahoney,
and Lee Ryan for collegial conversations and commentary. Special thanks to Eva Margaret
Raczkowski Coleman for outstanding research assistance and to Lauren Sorrentino for superlative editing.
Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of
Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1112 (1997) (citing the Su preme
Court’s assertion in Brown v. Bd. of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) that “Plessy was
wrong the day it was decided.”). See also Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness
and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race Law, 88 CAL . L. REV. 1923 (2000) (describing
U.S. racial history).
163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown, 347 U.S. 483.
Siegel, supra note 1, at 1112.
Id. at 1146.
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may take a position, trying to fight discrimination today, that is unpopular, but
will be vindicated with the passage of time.
In 1948 one warrior against bias, Justice Roger Traynor, wrote the
California Supreme Court decision in Perez v. Lippold.5 Try to imagine the
world in the 1940s when the petitioners in this case sought to compel the
county of Los Angeles to issue them a marriage license. The county refused
Ms. Perez, a white woman, and Mr. Davis, an African-American man, a license because of a California Civil Code section prohibiting interracial marriage.6 The petitioners brought their challenge not on equal protection
grounds, but on grounds of religious freedom. The 1940s preceded the rise of
public and judicial consciousness about the equal protection clause and the
notion of equal treatment which was to become the cornerstone of modern
civil rights law.
In his opinion, Justice Traynor acknowledged the sometimes pernicious
history of judicial decisions on race. He wrote: “Many courts in this country
have assumed that human beings can be judged by race and that other races
are inferior to the Caucasian.”7 He also noted that “[t]he effect of race
prejudice upon any community is unquestionably detrimental both to the minority that is singled out for discrimination and to the dominant group that
would perpetuate the prejudice.”8 Justice Traynor understood that the case
raised an equal protection issue. He recognized that as a country, we have
had a history of supporting white supremacy. He also understood that both
the victim and perpetrator are hurt by discriminatory beliefs, albeit in different
ways. Justice Traynor was truly ahead of his time.
The Perez decision held that the California law sections at issue violated
the equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution “by impairing the right of
individuals to marry on the basis of race alone and by arbitrarily and unreasonably discriminating against certain racial groups.”9 This decision was a
difficult one for the court, which voted by a bare majority, 4-3, to strike down
the statutes. Justice Traynor had no guidance from a higher court when he
cast his deciding vote and authored the opinion. It was not until 1967, almost
two decades later, that the U.S. Supreme Court would decide Loving v. Virginia,10 declaring similar statutes unconstitutional. Yet a different decision by
the California court would be unthinkable today.
We can only imagine what combination of intellect, judicial integrity, and
sensibility enabled Justice Traynor to be the visionary that he was. We can
only wonder what empowered him to provide leadership and the deciding vote
so that the eyes of history would judge this case as the obvious and correct

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

32 Cal.2d 711 (1948).
Cal. Civ. Code §§60, 69 (1933).
Perez, 32 Cal.2d at 720.
Id. at 725.
Id. at 731-2.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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decision. In the pre-Brown v. Board of Education11 era, legalized racial
segregation was still the norm. In this period, the dawning of the civil rights
movement, modern debates about racial justice were just beginning. It must
have been difficult for progressive judges to author decisions about racial
equality when so much of the public still actively endorsed racial segregation.
Decisions condoning interracial marriage and intimacy, though clearly the
right decisions in retrospect, must have risked public outcry. Tackling the
private sphere certainly must have been difficult in terms of potential public
resistance. Judges who made such decisions must have realized the profound
connection between private intimate relationships and the goal of wider social
and legal equality.
Much writing about racial bias and discrimination continues to focus on
the public sphere, where policy debates affect education, voting, housing, and
employment. Feminist scholars have long recognized the poverty of this public/private distinction, because the personal is political. 12 In her penetrating
and well-researched book, Moran examines the so-called private landscape of
race in the context of interracial intimacy. She urges the connection between
our personal, private views of race and racial issues and the policy decisions
society makes in the public realm. Moran notes that the colorblind rhetoric
that finds increasing popularity in the “public debate” about race contrasts
sharply with the accepted color consciousness that accompanies decisions
about intimacy and love in the “private sphere.” The fusion of these public
and private worlds demonstrates the need for more thoughtful analysis on
racial issues. Moran’s insights are critically important to a democracy based
on diversity.
One common thread throughout the book, initially exposed by Moran’s
examination of antimiscegenation ideology, is that the law hisorically has preserved white privilege by regulating intimate relationships. Whites were
stripped of white racial privilege following intimacy with African Americans.
(p. 20) Antimiscegenation laws served to reinforce a system of white racial
superiority. The power to ignore this systematic privileging of whiteness and
to ignore whiteness as a race in discussions of race marks an important characteristic of white racial privilege.13
This privileging of whiteness continues even as modern demographics
suggest that racial debates must no longer be conducted in black-white terms
as the United States becomes a nation of minorities. As John Calmore has
11.
12.

13.

347 U.S. 483 (1954).
See generally Martha A. Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence,
Autonomy, and Self-Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. P OL ’ Y , & L. 13 (1999); Martha Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. &
P OL ’ Y REV. 89 (1998); Frances Olsen, The Family & The Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform , 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of
Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589
(1986).
STEPHANIE M. W ILDMAN WITH CONTRIBU TIONS BY MARGALYNNE ARMSTRONG,
ADRIENNE D. DAVIS, & T RINA GRILLO, P RIVILEGE REVEALED : HOW I NVISIBLE
P REFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 20 (1996).
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explained, “the new demography could represent a complex development
wherein new people of color will consolidate white rule over black. At the
heart of that assumption is the idea that to be like white is important, of
course, but not as important as to be unlike black.”14 The root of this push “to
be unlike black” begins with antimiscegenation laws and the regulation of interracial intimacy.
In the first part of the book, Moran establishes the importance of her
subject, explaining that race and the meaning of race have been contested
throughout American history. (p. 3-4) We live in an era where noticing race
remains an issue fraught with political tension. Does the mere act of noticing
race equate with racism? If we fail to notice race, how can we end the effects of segregation that still remain in our schools, colleges, and other institutions that are essential to ensuring the population participates in democratic
government?
By turning the lens to interracial intimacy, Moran brings a fresh perspective to these questions. Rather than focusing on the arena of public life,
where battles about race are usually waged, the lens of interracial intimacy
provides insights into this public dimension through an exploration of private
relationships. As Moran observes in the first chapter: “[D]ilemmas of interracial intimacy demonstrate that the freedom to marry and build families is not
independent of race but instead is integral to defining it.” (p. 15) Moran examines interracial intimacy in the context of heterosexual partner relationships, particularly marriage, and in the area of placement of children in
families through custody and adoption. These examples of “love across the
color line” (p. 16) help us to investigate the meaning of race and racial equality.
After introducing her central project, Moran explores historic antimiscegenation laws in relation to the major racialized groups. Antimiscegenation
typically conjures images of black-white sex and marriage, where, particularly
in the South, these laws had their longest history. (p. 17) But antimiscegenation laws and sentiment also applied to Chinese, Japanese, Filipino, and other
Asians in the United States. As Moran explains, antimiscegenation laws
“served different functions at different times for different groups.” (p. 39)
Chapter Three explores the “central significance of race” (p. 43) in
daily life, describing the different role race played in the lives of racialized
groups. While African Americans could only achieve white status through
the phenomenon of passing (pp. 43-48), Native Americans and Latinos could
assimilate as whites. Antimiscegenation law in Virginia contained the “Pochahontas exception,” allowing those with Native American blood to be
classified as white. (p. 49) Native Americans and Mexicans “could use their
social ties to whites to identify their offspring as white.” (p. 52) The Treaty
of Guadalupe Hidalgo provided that Mexican citizens in the territories an14.

John O. Calmore, Race-Conscious Voting Rights and the New Demography in a Multira cing America, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1253, 1258 (2001).
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nexed by the United States would “enjoy the full privileges of American citizenship” at least as a matter of formal law. (p. 56) This formal promise led
to racial confusion as racial boundaries blurred. (pp. 56-59)
Chapter Four considers the role of antimiscegenation laws in establishing societal norms in sexual and marital customs. In addition to reinforcing
white racial superiority, antimiscegenation laws placed “middle -class aspirations for love and marriage at the pinnacle of respectability.” (p. 75) This
respectability valued the white, heterosexual nuclear family. The resulting
increased pressure for assimilation denied the value of alternative cultural
practices relating to sex, marriage, and child rearing, such as cohabitation and
kinship network support. Antimiscegenation laws resulted in differential impact on the major racialized groups with respect to the construction and destruction of their families. (p. 75)
In Chapter Five, the heart of the book for those interested in the change
in law and its implication for societal practice, Moran describes the series of
antimiscegenation decisions that led to the U.S. Supreme Court’s famous decision, Loving v. Virginia.15 Here Moran introduces Perez v. Lippold,16
Justice Traynor’s landmark opinion and “the first and only state high court
[decision] since Reconstruction to declare a ban on interracial marriage unconstitutional.” (p. 84) Moran describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s reticence
to address antimiscegenation statutory reform, from denials of certiorari (pp.
89-90) through recasting the issue as one of racial equality in the criminal justice system. (pp. 93-94) Through the evolution of these cases, the Court became the reluctant champion of legal change with Loving.
The Court relied upon “principles of both liberty and equality in striking
down the statute.” (p. 98) The majority characterized the racial classifications made by the statute as “measures designed to maintain white supremacy.” Id. It is worth noting the Supreme Court’s historic first use of the
phrase “white supremacy” in the text of the Loving opinion.17 Thus it was in
the so-called private context of interracial intimacy that the Court spoke with
the boldest truth, naming the maintenance of white supremacy as the evil result of segregationist practice that noticed race. The Court did not deplore all
racial classification, but rather its use in this harmful context, where the custom of noticing race violated the nation’s most sacred democratic principles.
As Moran notes, before the Loving decision, choice of a marital partner
was dictated by laws on race. Moran continues by exploring race and romanticism in the post-Loving era, detailing the persistence of same-race marriage even after the legal ban on interracial relationships was lifted.
Heterosexual marriage thus remains an area where noticing race and making
racialized choices is an accepted practice, under the guise of romanticism and

15.
16.
17.

388 U.S. 1 (1967).
32 Cal.2d 711 (1948). See also supra text accompanying notes 5-9.
388 U.S. at 7, 11.
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personal choice.18 In contrast, in the public sphere, increasingly, pressures to
be colorblind and not to notice race have predominated. 19
Moran explains how racial intermarriage is usually explained by exceptionalism and exoticism. (p. 114) 20 She observes:
The most striking feature of the aftermath of Loving v. Virginia is how readily
people have accepted segregation in marriage, so long as it is not officially
mandated. Despite compelling evidence that race continues to matter in affairs
of the heart, Americans embrace a colorblind ideal. Same-race marriages are not
considered evidence of racism, nor are they seen as a barrier to racial equality.
(p. 124)

This comment highlights the importance of Moran’s work. The powerful
ideal of colorblindness underlies any contemporary discussion of race. Moran
shows that in our most intimate choices we do not act as though we are colorblind. Yet the connection between that racialized selection and public sector policy choices is ignored by decisionmakers. Moran urges them to make
that connection, since our intimate lives form the basis for our experience of
the world.
The idea that the Constitution is colorblind hearkens back to Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, the case that elevated “separate but
equal” accommodations to a legal principle.21 Harlan stated, “Our constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens. In
respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.”22 However, the
preceding passage from his famous dissent is rarely quoted. Harlan prefaced
his colorblind assertion with these words:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this country. And so it
is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth, and in power. So, I
doubt not, it will continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage
. . . .23

This passage illustrates the poverty of colorblindness as a racial mantra.24
Even its most-cited proponent supported the idea of white racial privilege.
18.
19.

20.

21.
22.
23.
24.

Reva Siegel names the phenomenon that perpetuates racial hierarchies, even while society
undergoes change, “preservation through transformation.” Siegel, supra note 1, at 1113.
Morris B. Abram, Affirmative Action: Fair Shakers and Social Engineers, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1312, 1318 (1986) (describing affirmative action as social engineering or, in reality, a
quota system, that is a “result -oriented conception of racial justice [that] is both destructive
of true racial equality and potentially harmful to society.”).
See generally Sumi K. Cho, Converging Stereotypes in Racialized Sexual Harassment:
Where the Model Minority Meets Suzi Wong, 1 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 177 (1997) (discussing how race and gender stereotypes of Asian Pacific American women as submissive
may converge, making them targets for racialized sexual harassment by white men who
may be titillated by such stereotypes).
163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896).
Id. at 556.
Id. at 559.
On the poverty of colorblindness, see also Neil Gotanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution Is
Color-blind,” 44 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1991).
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The fact that citation to this white racial superiority passage is rarely made to
accompany advocacy in support of the colorblind ideal demonstrates the continued lack of recognition of the white privilege dynamic in racial discourse.25
At this point the book shifts emphasis from romantic love to familial
love, exploring the role of race in custody and adoption decisions. The relevance of race to child placement determinations has been “hotly debated.” (p.
127) Policy inconsistencies, again with different treatment for racialized
groups, have emerged. For example, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA),
preserves tribal leaders’ desires to keep Indian children in the tribal community and confers “jurisdiction on tribal courts to decide placement cases involving Indian children.” (p. 135) The Act’s passage responded to child
welfare authorities’ disproportionate removal of Indian children from their
families. Id. Although ICWA and the parameters of its application remain
contested, the mere existence of the Act demonstrates that policy makers do
not consistently embrace notions of colorblindness.
One U.S. Supreme Court decision specifically acknowledged that a
child’s life within an interracial family might in fact be detrimental to the
child’s best interests precisely because we live in a world where people are
not colorblind. 26 The case involved the placement of a child following divorce. The child’s white father sued to take custody away from the child’s
white mother because the mother was living with a Black man. When reversing the Florida state court decisions awarding custody to the father, Chief Justice Burger, speaking for the Court, wrote, “private biases may be outside the
reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”27
As this chapter shows, “simplistic norms of either colorblindness or color consciousness”
(p. 152) do not offer answers for child placement decisions.
Societal segregation is a reality, even as some families seek to transcend the
color line.
Moran continues to examine the intersection of families and romantic
love through the lens of race, considering the relation of race and identity in
the context of the movement toward a new multiracialism. Some have urged
intermarriage as a solution to racial problems. (p. 171-72) For example, Ward
Connerly, architect of California’s ban on affirmative action, said, “[i]n 10 to
15 years, inter-marriage will make this entire debate [over racial and ethnic
preferences] a moot one.” (p. 171) Moran, however, disagrees, and in some
of her most articulate and passionate prose criticizes the marital melting pot
solution as “misplaced optimism and dangerous complacency.” (p. 178) As
Moran’s book explains, the option of intermarriage is not equally available to
25.

26.
27.

See W ILDMAN , supra note 13 at 87. For further elaboration of privilege, see generally
RUTH FRANKENBERG , WHITE W OMEN , RACE MATTERS: T HE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF
W HITENESS (1993); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See.” White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of Discrim inatory Intent, 91 M ICH . L. REV. 953 (1993); Martha
R. Mahoney, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. PA . L . REV. 1659
(1995).
Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).
Id.
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all racialized groups. Blacks have the least “opportunity,” if one believes intermarriage is a positive racial policy event, to avail themselves of the chance.
Considering, in the final chapter, the lessons of interracial intimacy,
Moran acknowledges that “[i]nterracial relationships today are more widely
accepted . . . [b]ut they remain anomalous and in need of explanation.” (p.
179) “When 95 percent of all marriages in America take place between people of the same race, race shapes marital choice; but just as importantly, marriage shapes racial identity . . . . The freedom to select our intimates is also
the power to define racial difference.” (p. 191) While the government can no
longer dictate personal choices about our closest relationships, we make those
personal choices in the context of segregated residential, educational, and
employment environments. The end to government regulation of interracial
marriage has not resulted in an integrated society; racial segregation remains
the reality in most of our private lives.
As Moran notes, “[z]oning policy, home loan programs, integration of
schools, and affirmative action in workplaces—all of these can help individuals to rethink their assumptions about a good place to live, good working conditions, and a quality learning environment.” (p. 194) We all continue to make
racialized choices in our daily lives. Moran concludes, fittingly, with an exhortation for us all to act affirmatively to undo societal segregation and remake our notion of race. The segregated status quo, though no longer legally
mandated, will govern racial views and reinforce societal segregation. Thus
she urges: “We can undo race before it undoes us.” (p. 196)
Undoing race necessarily involves undoing the system of white racial
privileging embodied in the antimiscegenation laws that regulated interracial
intimacy, as well as systems of privilege based on gender and sexual orie ntation. The strength of Moran’s exploration of interracial intimacy lies in its
illumination of the part of race privileging that usually remains veiled as private conduct. Yet, as Moran compellingly shows, the “private” implicates
public policy.
While her book does not explore explicitly interracial intimacy in the
context of same-sex relationships, Moran’s compelling coverage of heterosexual interracial intimacy highlights the absences and the silences that mark
interracial gay and lesbian relationships. Interracial gay and lesbian relationships represent another area usually viewed as a private one, yet societal implications stem from the so-called private landscape. Given the taboos long
associated with interracial intimacy that Moran describes and the lack of legal
sanction granted to gay and lesbian relationships, it is not surprising that this
topic appears invisible in legal literature. As Mary Becker notes:
In only three states, Hawaii, Alaska, and most recently, Vermont, have judges
been able to imagine same-sex marriage . . . . In Baehr v. Lewin, the Supreme
Court of Hawaii held that the denial of a marriage license to lesbian and gay
couples violated the Equal Rights Amendment to the Hawaiian Constitution.
The court reasoned that if a statute banning interracial marriage discriminated
on the basis of race, as the United States Supreme Court had held in Loving v.
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Virginia, then a statute banning same-sex marriage discriminated on the basis
of sex in violation of the provision against sex discrimination in the Hawaiian
Constitution.28

A number of articles have examined the analogical reasoning exemplified by
the Baehr court. These scholars consider whether this reasoning, urging parallels between equal protection as used in Loving and the prohibition against
same-sex marriage, helps the debate about legitimating gay and lesbian intimacy, and scholars critique the use of analogies in this setting.29
Legal scholars have noted the tendency to assume whiteness as a race
for gays and lesbians, rendering lesbians and gay men of color invisible. This
whiteness presumption impedes the deconstruction of racial meaning necessary to advancing equality. Darren Hutchinson explains:
[P]ro- and anti-gay discourses and antiracist theory collectively contribute to a
white-normative construction of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identity—a narrow, racialized construct that hinders gay and lesbian equality efforts. . . . [L]aw and sexuality scholars should adopt a multidimensional lens to
analyze sexual subordination claims and to portray gay and lesbian experience.
A mu ltidimensional analysis of heterosexism and homophobia—one that exa mines the various racial, class, gender, and other dimensions of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered identity and the diverse effects of heterosexism—
can destabilize the "gay as white and privileged" stereotype.30

28.

29.

30.

Mary Becker, Family Law in the Secular State and Restrictions on Same-Sex Marriage:
Two are Better than One, 2001 U. ILL . L. REV. 1, 4 (2001). See also Baehr v. Lewin, 852
P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (stating that the right to same sex marriage is not “so rooted in
the traditions and collective conscience of our people that failure to recognize it would violate the fundamental principles of liberty and justice that lie at the base of all our civil and
political institutions.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (creating domestic part nerships to provide same-sex couples with common benefits equivalent to those enjoyed by
married couples, but still not permitting same-sex marriage). Preceding both Baker and
Baehr, the U.S. Supreme Court chose to view the issue of same-sex relationships in light of
criminal activity, rather than as an issue of privacy and fundamental rights. Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1984) (upholding the constitutionality of Georgia’s sodomy stat ute).
Becker, supra note 27, at 3-4. See also William N. Eskridge, Jr., Law and the Construction
of the Closet: American Regulation of Same-Sex Intimacy, 1880-1946, 82 I OWA L. REV.
1007 (1997) (paralleling the development of anti-homosexual mores to tacit acceptance of
discrimination on the basis of race and gender); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis
“ Intersectionality,” “ Multidimensionality,” and the Development of an Adequate Theory of
Subordination, 6 MICH . J. RACE & L. 285 (2001) (criticizing the use of analogy as essentialist); Sandra L. Rierson, Race and Gender Discrimination: A Historical Case for Equal
Treatment Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 DUKE J. GENDER L. & P OL ’ Y 89 (1994)
(identifying the steps of progress under Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence and arguing
that Blacks have progressed more rapidly than women through those steps); Sharon Elizabeth Rush, Equal Protection Analogies—Identity and “ Passing”: Race and Sexual Orientation, 13 HARV. BLACK LETTER L.J. 65 (1997) (conside ring the importance and dangers of
using analogy).
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Gay Rights” for “ Gay Whites”?: Race, Sexual Identity, and
Equal Protection Discourse, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1358, 1361 (2000). See also Devon W.
Carbado, Black Rights, Gay Rights, Civil Rights, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1467, 1474 (2000) (The
idea “that homosexuality is something that white people ‘do’ [and something that Black
people should not ‘do’] has been circulated and reified in black communities at least since
the 1960s.”). See also, Peter Kwan, Complicity and Complexity: Cosynthesis and Praxis,
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Furthermore, the failure to use a multidimensional perspective, a perspective that resists essentializing identity categories, renders invisible the
daily choices we make to sustain systems of subordination. As Devon Carbado observes:
All of us make choices every day that legitimize certain discriminatory practices.
. . . Many of us get married and/or attend weddings, even as lesbian and gay
marriages are not legally recognized. Others of us have racially monolithic social encounters, live in de facto white only (or predominantly white) neighborhoods, or send our kids to white only (or predominantly white) schools. Still
others of us have "straight only" associations—that is, our friends are all heterosexuals and our children's friends all have mommies and daddies. These
choices are not just personal; they are political. And the cumulative effect of
these micro-political choices is the entrenchment of the very social practices—
racism, sexism, classism, and homophobia—we profess to abhor. 31

The politically cumulative effect of these choices is an important thesis in
Moran’s book as well, although not addressed with regard to sexual orientation.
Nevertheless, Interracial Intimacy serves as a powerful reminder of
the force of categories and the categorical thinking that makes our brains essentialize. Our minds need categories in order to think,32 so we think of race,
gender, sexual orientation, and wealth as defining. 33 But, as important scholarship on subordination has emphasized, these categories are not mutually
exclusive.34 So when the topic is interracial intimacy, it is important to remember that gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgendered interracial relationships
will add another dimension of understanding to the dynamic of change.35
Insights from gay and lesbian relationships across racial lines can contribute to an understanding and ending of subordinating social practices. As
Dorain Leslie and Lauren Mac Neill observe:

31.
32.

33.
34.

35.

49 DE P AUL L. REV. 673, 688 (2000) (raising the idea that “we can afford to rethink the
notion of ethnic identity in terms of cultural, class, and gender differences, rather than presuming similarities and making the erasure of particularity the basis of unity.”).
Devon W. Carbado, Straight Out of the Closet, 15 BERKELEY W OMEN ’ S L.J. 76, 78 (2000).
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
581-2, 585 (1990) (describing Funes, whose life of infinite unique experiences leaves him
unable to cat egorize. “To think is to forget differences, generalize, make abstractions. In
the teeming world of Funes, there were only details, almost immediate in their presence.”).
See W ILDMAN , supra note 13, at 9 (describing the need to know whether someone is a boy
or a girl in order to know how to relate to them).
See, e.g., Carbado, supra note 30; Kimberlè Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of
Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory
and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989); Harris, supra note 31; Clark
Freshman, Whatever Happened to Anti-Semitism? How Social Science Theories Identify
Discrimination and Promote Coalitions Between “ Different” Minorities, 85 CORNELL L.
REV. 313 (2000); Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: “ Intersectionality,” “ Multidimensionality,” and the Develo pment of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH . J.
RACE & L. 285 (2001).
See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Conflation
of “Sex,” “Gender,” and “Sexual Orientation” in Euro -American Law and Society, 83
CAL . L. REV. 1 (1995).
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Lesbians in interracial relationships challenge and confront racism in themselves and in the other, in perhaps more active, overt ways than those in samerace relationships. . . . Lesbians in interracial relationships confront differences
in culture and values in areas such as the role of family, the role of the individual, money and economic issues, food, religion, childrearing behavior, and homosexuality. Recognition of the differences is essential. Sometimes the couple
will find that the differences are destructive or divisive; other times, the partners will find them strengthening and enriching.36

The micro-political choice to fail to see interracial gay and lesbian relations
contributes to the cumulative invisibility of gay and lesbian relations, generally
and the racing of these relationships as white. Interestingly, three of the couples in Baehr v. Lewin, the historic Hawaii case interpreting the state’s marriage law to allow gay and lesbian relations were mixed racially. 37 Yet the
opinion does not mention that fact and news coverage has been scarce. In
the modern political context that supports colorblindness, the automatic reaction seems to be that noticing race is bad. Yet, as Moran teaches, the failure
to notice race and to observe that most intimate choices are made on samerace lines does not serve equality goals. Roger Traynor understood that it
was not the act of noticing race, but rather its use to perpetuate white supremacy, that was the constitutionally objectionable practice. Noticing race
and other identity categories can promote the education of all citizens for the
practice of democracy. Noticing race need not equate with using race for the
purpose of subordination. Noticing race across these identity categories is
necessary to dismantle the systems of privilege that led to the world where
interracial intimacy was prohibited.
With Interracial Intimacy: The Regulation of Race and Romance,
Rachel F. Moran makes an meaningful contribution to the literature on race
and races in the United States and confirms her place as a significant scholar
in contemporary America. Interracial Intimacy is an interesting and consequential book on several levels. A major strength of the book lies in its recognition that the role of race as to the major racialized groups has not been
uniform, but rather has been historic, contingent, and evolving. 38 The book’s
exposition of the role that the so-called personal sphere plays in the determination of public policy is another significant contribution. Most importantly, it
is a book about social change. From rigid rules prohibiting marriage across
the color line, the human spirit has evolved so that those marriages are no
longer prohibited. Perhaps the next evolution will accept marriages and part36.
37.
38.

Dorain Leslie and Lauren Mac Neill, Double Positive: Lesbians and Race, in RACISM IN THE
LIVES OF W OMEN : TESTIMONY, THEORY , AND GUIDES TO ANTIRACIST P RACTICE 168
(Jeanne Adleman & Gloria Enguídanos, eds. 1995).
Myron Dean Quon, What Asian Americans Have in Common with Same-Sex Marriages,
available at http://www.lambdalegal.org/cgi-bin/iowa/documents/record?record=326 (last
visited Feb. 3, 2002).
See also JUAN F. PEREA , RICHARD DELGADO , ANGELA P. HARRIS, & STEPHANIE M.
W ILDMAN , RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA (2000)
(examining the hist ories of major racialized groups).
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nerships that transcend gendered heterosexual boundaries. Moran’s book
gives cause for optimism that while systems of privilege do exist and the
status quo perpetuates subordination, real social change can and has occurred
in the sphere of interracial intimacy.

